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Abstract
The notion of persistently optimal strategy in gambling theory is analogous to that of subgame-
perfect equilibria in game theory. We prove the existence of persistently ǫ-optimal strategies for
the players engaged in a nonleavable stochastic game with finite state space.
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Persistently Good Strategies for Nonleavable
Stochastic Games With Finite State Space
Piercesare Secchi
William D. Sudderth
1 Introduction and Preliminaries
The purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of persistently ǫ-optimal strategies for the players
engaged in a nonleavable stochastic game. This is a two-person, multi-stage, zero-sum competition
which Maitra and Sudderth (1992) defined by means of five elements: a state space S, two finite
sets of actions A and B, for player I and II respectively, a law of motion q which maps S ×A×B
into the set of probability distributions defined on S and a bounded utility function u : S → ℜ. The
dynamics of a nonleavable stochastic gameN (u)(x) with initial state x ∈ S are the following; player
I chooses an action a1 ∈ A while simultaneosly player II chooses an action b1 ∈ B and the game
moves to the state X1 according to the probability distribution q(·|x, a1, b1). This ends the first
stage of the game; in the second stage the players choose actions a2 ∈ A and b2 ∈ B respectively
and the game moves to the state X2 according to the probability distribution q(·|X1, a2, b2). By
iterating this procedure for an inifinite number of stages an infinite sequence {Xn} of states is
produced; the payoff of the game from player II to player I is defined to be the expected value of
u∗ = lim supu(Xn).
Maitra and Sudderth (1992) proved the existence of ǫ-optimal strategies for the players engaged
in a nonleavable game N (u) by showing that the game always has a value V in the sense that, for
every initial state x ∈ S,
inf
β
sup
α
Ex,α,βu
∗ = sup
α
inf
β
Ex,α,βu
∗ = V (x)
where α and β range over the set of strategies available to player I and II respectively. For a
complete introduction to nonleavable stochastic games we refer to the book of Maitra and Sudderth
(1996); in what follows we will use the same notation and terminology as in the book and in
(Secchi,1997b) without any further comment.
Given ǫ > 0 and the initial state x ∈ S of the game N (u), a strategy α is said to be per-
sistently ǫ-optimal for I at x if it is ǫ-optimal and, for every n ≥ 1 and every partial history
p = ((x1, a1, b1), . . . , (xn, an, bn)) of length n, the conditional strategy α[p] is ǫ-optimal for I for the
game N (u)(xn). A family of strategies α¯ is persistently ǫ-optimal if α¯(x) is persistently ǫ-optimal
for all x ∈ S. Analogous definitions hold for II. We note that, for all x ∈ S, n ≥ 1 and all partial
histories p = ((x1, a1, b1), . . . , (xn, an, bn)), the game N (u)(xn) is a proper subgame of N (u)(x);
therefore when a player uses a persistently ǫ-optimal strategy α he cannot gain more than ǫ by
deviating from α in any subgame of N (u)(x). In this sense the definition of persistently ǫ-optimal
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strategy coincides with that of subgame-ǫ-perfect equilibria of Selten (1965). Our terminology
stems from gambling theory and from the analogous definitions due in that setting to Dubins and
Sudderth (1977).
The notion of persistently optimal strategy is related to that of stationarity. In fact, if α¯ is an ǫ-
optimal stationary family of strategies, then α¯ is persistently ǫ-optimal since, for every x ∈ S, n ≥ 1
and partial history p = ((x1, a1, b1), . . . , (xn, an, bn)), α¯(x)[p] = α¯(xn). In (Secchi, 1997b) it is
shown that an ǫ-optimal stationary family is always available to player II when the state space S
of the nonleavable game N (u) is finite. However Example 7.13.4 of Maitra and Sudderth (1996), a
variation of an example of Kumar and Shiau (1981), shows that player I need not have an ǫ-optimal
stationary strategy at a fixed initial state of the game, even if S is finite. Therefore the following
theorem takes on interest; together with the results in (Secchi, 1997b) it settles affirmatively the
question regarding the existence of persistently ǫ-optimal strategies for the players engaged in a
nonleavable game with finite state space.
1.1 Theorem. Let ǫ > 0. For any nonleavable game N (u) defined on a finite state space S, a
persistently 4ǫ-optimal family of strategies µ¯ is available to player I.
When the state space of the game S is infinite and the utility u is unbounded, player I need
not have a persistently ǫ-optimal strategy. This follows from the next example which appears in
van der Wal (1981) and is a modification of an example given by Blackwell (1967). Incidentally
the example shows that subgame-ǫ-perfect equilibria need not exist for all zero-sum games with a
value.
1.2 Example. Let S = {. . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . .}, A = {0, 1}, and B = {0}; player II is therefore
a dummy and the game is really a one-player one. If x < 0, set u(x) = 2−x and q(x|x, 0, 0) =
q(x|x, 1, 0) = 1; if x > 0, set u(x) = 0, q(x+ 1|x, 1, 0) = 1− q(0|x, 1, 0) = b(x)/(2b(x+ 1)), with
b(x) = 1 +
1
x
,
and q(−x|x, 0, 0) = 1. Finally define u(0) = 0 and q(0|0, 0, 0) = q(0|0, 1, 0) = 1. Therefore all
nonpositive states are absorbing and the utility u is non null only on the strictly negative states.
For all strategies σ available to player I, let π0(σ) be the probability that action 1 is chosen
at the first stage of the game. Given an initial state x ∈ S, we also define the partial histories
pn = ((x+1, 1, 0), (x+2, 1, 0), . . . , (x+n, 1, 0)), n≥ 1. Let 0 be the only strategy available to player
II. Then, for all x > 0 and all strategies σ of player I we may compute
Ex,σ,0u
∗ = (1− π0(σ))2
x+ π0(σ)(1− π0(σ[p1]))
b(x)
2b(x+ 1)
2x+1 + . . . (1.3)
. . .+ π0(σ)[Π
n−1
i=1 π0(σ[pi])](1− π0(σ[pn]))
b(x)
2b(x+ 1)
· · ·
b(x+ n− 1)
2b(x+ n)
2x+n + . . . .
Hence
sup
σ
Ex,σ,0u
∗ ≤ sup{
b(x)
b(x+ n)
2x : n ≥ 0} = b(x)2x.
Let σ∗ be the strategy selecting action 1 with probability one for the first n+ 1 stages of the
game, n ≥ 1, and then action 0 forever; then
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Ex,σ∗,0u
∗ =
b(x)
b(x+ n)
2x.
This shows that, for all x > 0,
sup
σ
Ex,σ,0 ≥ sup{
b(x)
b(x+ n)
2x : n ≥ 0} = b(x)2x.
Therefore the game has value V (x) = b(x)2x. Obviously, V (0) = 0 and V (x) = 2−x for all
x < 0.
Before proving that no persistently ǫ-optimal strategy is available to player I if the initial state
of the game is big enough, we find a necessary condition for a strategy σ to be ǫ-optimal for I when
the initial state of the game is strictly positive. Let 0 < ǫ ≤ 1 and x > 0. If σ is ǫ-optimal for I at
x, then
b(x)2x − ǫ = V (x)− ǫ
≤ (1− π0(σ))2
x+ π0(σ)
b(x)
2b(x+ 1)
Ex,σ[p1],0u
∗
≤ (1− π0(σ))2
x+ π0(σ)
b(x)
2b(x+ 1)
V (x+ 1)
= (1− π0(σ))2
x+ π0(σ)b(x)2
x.
Hence,
1− π0(σ) ≤
2−x
b(x)− 1
ǫ ≤ x2−x.
Now let ǫ = 1, x ≥ 5 and assume there is a strategy µ persistently 1-optimal for I at x.
Then for all n ≥ 1 and all partial histories p = ((x1, a1, 0), . . . , (xn, an, 0)) with xi > 0, and
ai ∈ A, i = 1, . . . , n,
1− π0(µ[p]) ≤ xn2
−xn .
This inequality and equation (1.3) imply that
Ex,µ,0u
∗ ≤ (1− π0(µ))2
x +
b(x)
2b(x+ 1)
(1− π0(µ[p1])2
x+1 + . . .
. . .+
b(x)
2b(x+ 1)
· · ·
b(x+ n− 1)
2b(x+ n)
(1− π0(µ[pn])2
x+n + . . .
≤ x+
2
3
(x+ 1) + . . .+ (
2
3
)n(x+ n) + . . .
= 3x+ 6
where we used the fact that b(x + n)/(2b(x + n + 1)) ≤ 2/3 for all n ≥ 0, if x ≥ 1. But
3x+ 6 < V (x)− 1, if x ≥ 5, and thus µ is not persistently 1-optimal at x since it is not 1-optimal.
⋄
When S is countably infinite and u is bounded, it is still an open question whether a player
engaged in a nonleavable game N (u) has a persistently ǫ-optimal family of strategies.
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2 Proof of Theorem 1.1
Before constructing a family of strategies persistently good for player I in the nonleavable game
N (u), we begin by considering a leavable game L(u) defined on the finite state space S by means
of the same law of motion q, utility u and sets of actions A and B for I and II respectively as N (u),
but with the additional feature that player I is now allowed to stop the game according to a stop
rule t of her choice and the payoff from II to I is the expected value of the utility u(Xt) of the state
reached by the game when it is stopped. Leavable games have a value and an optimal stationary
family of strategies is always available to player II (Maitra and Sudderth, 1992); for all ǫ > 0, the
existence of an ǫ-optimal stationary family for player I was proved by Secchi (1997a).
Set U0 = u and, for all n ≥ 1, define Un = u ∨GUn−1 where G is the one-day operator defined
for any bounded, real-valued function φ on S and for every x ∈ S, by
(Gφ)(x) = inf
ν
sup
µ
Ex,ν,µφ, (2.4)
with µ and ν ranging over P(A) and P(B), the sets of probability distributions defined on A
and B respectively. For all n ≥ 1, Un ≥ Un−1 and the sequence {Un} converges to the value U of
L(u) (Maitra and Sudderth, 1992); the convergence is uniform since S is finite.
Fix ǫ > 0 sufficiently small and such that, for all x ∈ S, |U(x) − u(x)| ≤ ǫ if and only if
U(x) = u(x). Let m be an integer such that supx∈S|Um(x)− U(x)| <
ǫ
2 , and let
0 = ǫ0 < ǫ1 < . . . < ǫm =
ǫ
2
.
Define, for all x ∈ S,
φ(x) =Max{Uk(x)− ǫk : 0 ≤ k ≤ m}.
Note that u ≤ φ ≤ U ; when φ(x) = u(x)
U(x)− ǫ ≤ Um(x)−
ǫ
2
≤ φ(x) = u(x).
Therefore φ(x) = u(x) if and only if u(x) = U(x).
We now introduce a function µǫ : S → P(A) generating a stationary family µ
∞
ǫ which is 2ǫ-
optimal for I in L(u). If φ(x) > u(x), let k = k(x) be such that φ(x) = Uk(x) − ǫk and set
µǫ(x) ∈ P(A) to be optimal for I in the one-day game A(Uk−1)(x). If φ(x) = u(x) let µǫ(x) be
optimal for I in the one-day-game A(U)(x).
For all k ≥ 0, define
τ(k) = inf{n ≥ k : φ(Xn) = u(Xn)} = inf{n ≥ k : U(Xn) = u(Xn)}. (2.5)
The next two inequalities (2.6) and (2.7) regarding the stopping time τ(0) were demonstrated
in the course of the proof of Theorem 3.2 of Secchi (1997a) and will be very useful also in the
present context. The first implies that, no matter what player II does, the game will reach the set
of states where U = u with probability one if player I uses the stationary family µ∞ǫ . In fact, set
ζ =
1
2
min{ǫk − ǫk−1 : 0 ≤ k ≤ m}.
Then, for all x ∈ S and n ≥ 1,
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Px,µ∞ǫ (x),β[τ(0) ≥ n] ≤
2 ‖u‖
nζ
(2.6)
for all strategies β of II where ‖u‖ = max{|u(x)| : x ∈ S}; therefore τ(0) is finite with probability
one. Now choose n big enough so that 4 ‖u‖2(nζ)−1 ≤ ǫ. Then, for all x ∈ S,
Ex,µ∞ǫ (x),βu(Xτ (0)∧n) ≥ U(x)− 2ǫ (2.7)
against any strategy β of player II; this immediately implies that µ∞ǫ is 2ǫ-optimal for I in L(u).
When player I is not allowed to stop the game L(u) immediately, but must play at least for one
day, the following result is of use.
2.8 Lemma. For all x ∈ S and every strategy β of II,
Px,µ∞ǫ (x),β[τ(1) <∞] = 1 (2.9)
and
Ex,µ∞ǫ (x),βu(Xτ (1)) ≥ GU(x)− 2ǫ. (2.10)
Proof. Equation (2.9) follows from (2.6) and the fact that the conditional stopping time
τ(1)[X1] is equal to τ(0). In fact, for all x ∈ S,
Px,µ∞ǫ (x),β[τ(1) <∞] =
∫
PX1,µ∞ǫ (X1),β[X1][τ(0) <∞]dPx,µ∞ǫ (x),β = 1
for all β of II.
In order to prove (2.10), assume first that U(x) > u(x). Then τ(1) = τ(0) and, if 4 ‖u‖2(nζ)−1 ≤
ǫ,
Ex,µ∞ǫ (x),βu(Xτ (1)∧n) = Ex,µ∞ǫ (x),βu(Xτ (0)∧n) ≥ U(x)− 2ǫ = GU(x)− 2ǫ
against any β of II, where the last equality follows from the fact that U = u∨GU (Maitra and
Sudderth, 1992). Since u is bounded and τ(1) is finite with probability one, we get (2.10) in this
case by letting n→∞. If U(x) = u(x),
Ex,µ∞ǫ (x),βu(Xτ (1))
=
∫
EX1,µ∞ǫ (X1),β[X1]u(Xτ (0))dPx,µ∞ǫ (x),β
≥
∫
(U(X1)− 2ǫ)dPx,µ∞ǫ (x),β
≥ GU(x)− 2ǫ.
for any β of II; the next to the last inequality follows from (2.7) by letting n→∞, whereas the
last inequality is a consequence of the definition of µǫ. ⋄
We are now ready to return to the nonleavable game N (u) defined on the finite state space S.
Lemma 4.1 of Secchi (1997a) shows that the value V of N (u) is also the value of the leavable game
L(u∧V ) which is defined on S and has the same law of motion q and action spaces A and B for I and
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II respectively as the nonleavable game N (u), but utility u ∧ V. Applying the previous arguments
to the game L(u∧V ), set ǫ > 0 small enough and such that, for all x ∈ S, V (x)− (u∧V )(x) < ǫ if
and only if V (x) = (u∧V )(x). Then, for all k ≥ 0, the stopping time τ(k) defined by (2.5) becomes
τ(k) = inf{n ≥ k : V (Xn) ≤ u(Xn)}.
Lemma 2.8 implies that there is a stationary family µ∞ǫ for player I such that, for every x ∈ S
and every strategy β of II,
Px,µ∞ǫ (x),β[τ(1) <∞] = 1 (2.11)
and
Ex,µ∞ǫ (x),β(u ∧ V )(Xτ (1)) ≥ GV (x)− 2ǫ = V (x)− 2ǫ, (2.12)
where the last equality follows from the fact that GV = V (Maitra and Sudderth, 1996).
In order to introduce the family of strategies µ¯ǫ that will be proved to be persistently 4ǫ-
optimal for I in N (u), define a sequence of stopping times τn by setting τ0 = 0 and, for all n ≥ 0,
τn+1 = τ(τn+1). The family µ¯ǫ is constructed by sequential composition of the strategies {µ
∞
ǫ
2n−1
}
along the sequence {τn}, n = 1, 2, . . .. That is, for all x ∈ S, µ¯ǫ(x) follows µ
∞
ǫ (x) up to time τ1,
then uses µ∞ǫ
2
(Xτ1) up to time τ2 and so on. We will begin by proving, with the next two lemmas,
that µ¯ǫ is 4ǫ-optimal for player I.
2.13 Lemma. For every x ∈ S and β of II,
Px,µ¯ǫ(x),β[
∞⋂
n=1
[τn <∞]] = 1.
Proof. Note that, for every n ≥ 0, x ∈ S and β of player II,
Px,µ¯ǫ(x),β[τn+1 <∞] =
∫
PXτn ,µ∞ǫ
2n
(Xτn ),β[pτn]
[τ(1) <∞] dPx,µ¯ǫ(x),β.
if Px,µ¯ǫ(x),β[τn <∞] = 1. Now use (2.11) and induction on n. ⋄
2.14 Lemma. µ¯ǫ is 4ǫ-optimal for I in N (u).
Proof. Fix x ∈ S and a strategy β for II. For ease of notation, in the following we use P for
the probability Px,µ¯ǫ(x),β and E for the expected values computed with respect to P.
Define Y0 = V (x) and, for every n ≥ 1, set
Yn = V (Xτn) + 2ǫ
n−1∑
j=0
2−j .
The sequence {Yn} is a bounded submartingale with respect to P. In fact, for every n ≥ 0,
|Yn| < ‖u‖+ 4ǫ and
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E[Yn+1|X1, . . . , Xτn]
= E[V (Xτn+1)|X1, . . . , Xτn] + 2ǫ
n∑
j=0
2−j
= EXτn ,µ∞ǫ
2n
(Xτn ),β[pτn]
V (Xτn+1[pτn ]) + 2ǫ
n∑
j=0
2−j
≥ EXτn ,µ∞ǫ
2n
(Xτn ),β[pτn]
u ∧ V (Xτ (1)) + 2ǫ
n∑
j=0
2−j
≥ V (Xτn)− 2
ǫ
2n
+ 2ǫ
n∑
j=0
2−j
= Yn
where the first inequality holds because τn+1[pτn] = τ(1) and V ≥ u ∧ V, whereas the second
inequality follows from (2.12).
Being a bounded submartingale, {Yn} converges with P probability one and
E[ lim
n→∞
Yn] ≥ Y0 = V (x).
Therefore
E[ lim
n→∞
V (Xτn)] ≥ V (x)− 4ǫ
This proves the lemma since
Eu∗ = E[lim sup
n→∞
u(Xn)] ≥ E[lim sup
n→∞
u(Xτn)] ≥ E[ limn→∞
V (Xτn)]
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 2.13 and the second from the definition of τn. ⋄
Final steps of the proof of Theorem 1.1. In order to prove that µ¯ǫ is persistently 4ǫ-optimal,
it is enough to show that, for every x ∈ S, j ≥ 1 and partial history p = ((x1, a1, b1), . . . , (xj, aj, bj))
of length j,
Exj ,µ¯ǫ(x)[p],βu
∗ ≥ V (xj)− 4ǫ
against any strategy β of II.
Let k ≥ 0 be such that, for every history h′ = ((x′1, a
′
1, b
′
1), (x
′
2, a
′
2, b
′
2), . . .),
τk(ph
′) ≤ j < τk+1(ph
′)
with ph′ = ((x1, a1, b1), . . . , (xj, aj, bj), (x
′
1, a
′
1, b
′
1), (x
′
2, a
′
2, b
′
2), . . .). Now µ¯ǫ(x)[p] is the sequential
composition of the strategies {µ∞ ǫ
2k+n−1
} along the sequence {τk+n}, n = 1, 2, . . . , and, hence, equals
µ¯ ǫ
2k
(xj). The desired result now follows from Lemma 2.14. ⋄
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